Event Summary:
Dr. Nikolai Zlobin
Russia in the World: Washington Insider’s View on Moscow
10 July 2006
Head Office of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA)
Summary by: Karen Lu (Program Coordinator, CIIA National Office)
The CIIA’s Toronto branch hosted Dr. Nikolai Zlobin, Senior Fellow and Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the World Institute in Washington, D.C at CIIA’s National office on 10 July 2006. Among his many impressive accomplishments, Zlobin co-authored the first non-communist high school history text book used in Russia and other post-Soviet countries. In front of a full house, Zlobin shed light on Russian foreign and domestic policy priorities.
There is a new wave of interest in Russia—all eyes are fixed on its development trajectory in the coming years. Will Russia follow the North Korean, non-democratic, command-economy model of development or the democratic, open-economy model found in South Korea? An examination of Russia’s foreign and domestic policies shows signs of both.
Russia is in the international spotlight as Chair of the G8 ministerial meetings in St. Petersburg this month. The G8 meetings provide a forum for the assertion of Russian foreign policy priorities, the most important of which, is energy security. Russia’s G8 presidency is also a source of some insecurity; Putin’s and the Kremlin’s decisions are under an international microscope. Zlobin predicts that the G8 meetings will be a public relations success but the status quo will remain unchanged. The energy security question, the one most salient to Russian strategic interests, will remain unresolved.
Russia views energy security differently than the rest of the world. Energy security will be guaranteed through long-term government-to-government relations that bind the seller and buyer to 10-15 year-arrangements. Market liberalization of oil and gas is not the solution to a world energy crisis as the Americans would have us believe. Russia hopes to eliminate the instability that comes with daily price fluctuations in a free energy market through bilateral relations. Russia’s energy security is crucial to the consolidation of its position as a major energy superpower. Asserting Russia’s international influence also means securing the international and domestic conditions for realizing this ambition. These conditions include effective control over Eurasia and the simultaneous attenuation of American superiority in the world. Besides its superpower ambitions, Russia’s sheer territorial size (1/6 of the world) will make it an important global geopolitical player in the areas of nuclear energy, transportation and communications. This trend will continue despite a projected decline in Russia’s population by 50,000. According to Zlobin, a populated and developed territory is not, however, a prerequisite for the implementation of hydroelectric jump stations and communication satellites.
Russia’s energy ambitions are already evident in its monopoly over the purchase and sale of oil and gas in Central Asia. GazProm, Russia’s state-run gas company, has its sights set on becoming the biggest producer of gas in the world. Russia’s energy ambitions are, however, unprecedented insofar as they are synonymous with its nuclear ambitions, a proposition likely to be misunderstood by the public. The nature of Russia’s nuclear energy ambitions is likely to be misunderstood because there is confusion between nuclear energy intended to meet a country’s energy needs and uranium enrichment intended to produce nuclear weapons. With the mounting price of oil in the last 12-18 months, nuclear energy has emerged as the cheapest energy source. Nuclear energy is attractive to states for another reason: the technology is self-sustaining. A state that has the capacity to generate nuclear energy also has the autonomy to solve its own energy problems without having to seek foreign energy sources. The problem is that there are currently no peaceful nuclear technologies in existence; nuclear technology has only existed in its military form—for the production of weapons. Nuclear energy appears to be the alternative to ever-increasing prices in oil and gas but the test then becomes whether a model to supply nuclear energy non-militarily can be effectively developed and sustained. At the same time, Russia’s aim to become a nuclear energy superpower may not be entirely benign. Publicly, Russia will support the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons but privately, it will welcome American military engagement in Iran over the nuclear issue and that conflict’s attendant destabilization of world gas and oil prices.
Russia’s energy policies abroad appear to be serving its economy well but there should be no illusions about its fragility. Russia’s economy is not modernized; its ability to export gas and oil is decreasing and Russia is on the brink of a domestic energy crisis. It is predicted that by 2015, GazProm will neither produce enough gas to remain a domestic or world supplier. Although Russia needs serious foreign investment to sustain its energy sector ambitions, the Kremlin is also unwilling to relinquish its ownership and management rights to foreign investors. This is the nature of Russia’s long-term investment problem; the property rights of foreign investors cannot be ensured. China was ready to sign a 100-year agreement to invest in Russian energy but was turned down. This is indicative of Russia’s political mentality; it refuses to be a junior partner to anyone in the world.
Disposable income and economic growth are on the rise in Russia. Quality of life seems to be higher; people are feeling more financially secure but paradoxically, more politically passive. There is neither political struggle nor competition over democracy, human rights and freedom of the press. The proof is in Putin’s 75% popular approval rating, a number that suggests Putin is more legitimate than Bush.
Perhaps the most serious political problem will arise with the transition to Putin’s successor in 2008. Russia’s political party system is fragile—one built on internal, politically expedient agreements. The challenge will be to keep the system intact once Putin leaves, an outcome that would be historically unprecedented; there has never been a political transition in leadership that has not destroyed the system itself. Zlobin predicts that the transition to Putin’s successor will be peaceful but undemocratic. Currently, there are 35 political parties registered in Russia but only five have been approved. This antidemocratic trend is punctuated by new laws that give the Russian state greater control over domestic civil society groups.
Observers of Russia in the West are left with a choice to make: Do we want an economically stable Russia that can help to deal with world problems or a democratic, westernized Russia?
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