Event Summary:
Panel Discussion on Afghanistan: Canada’s Options and Stakes
11 May 2006
Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI)
Summary by: Karen Lu (Head Office, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto)
The Toronto Branch of the CIIA convened a panel to discuss Canada’s options and stakes in Afghanistan on 11 May 2006 at the historic Royal Canadian Military Institute. The inclement weather did not keep people away, including former Minister for International Cooperation, the Honourable Aileen Carroll. The panel could not have been timelier: Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter MacKay has warned that our mission in Afghanistan could take longer than expected—beyond our initial commitment until February 2007 to 2009—and Parliament is set to debate and vote on such an extension. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has also kept the door to a military mission in Darfur open. It is safe to say that Canada will not be abdicating its role as ‘peace-maker’ anytime soon so it is important that we are clear about what a peace-making mission entails especially in Afghanistan as it is poised to serve as a model of Canada’s future engagements with ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states as well as a testing ground for the much-touted 3D (defence, diplomacy, and development) approach. The panel was moderated by Toronto Branch President Keith Martin and featured three experts: Haroon Siddiqui, Senior Columnist for the Toronto Star, David Rudd, Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies and Sergei Plekhanov, Associate Professor of Political Science at York University.
For all of the uncertainty surrounding Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, one thing is clear: We are not engaged in peacekeeping. The purpose of the mission is not to enforce a ceasefire agreement between two warring factions. The purpose is to rebuild the state of Afghanistan. It all sounds very noble and benign but the mission is fraught with perils. Haroon Siddiqui points out that the former Martin government has been less than honest with Canadians about the mission’s nature, duration and scope. Canadians did not know the mission would be long-term, a decade or longer according to General Rick Hillier’s estimate. Canadian troops are part of a multinational, NATO-led international security assistance force but are de facto under US command. Moreover, Afghanistan is a failed mission according to Siddiqui. Osama bin Laden remains at large in spite of a $25 million bounty on his head. The problem of opium production is greater than ever—Afghanistan itself produces 86% of the world’s heroin. What, then, is the solution to this problem? The mission needs to be better defined and Canada must be clear what it can contribute and what it cannot.
Professor Sergei Plekhanov identified three issues of consideration in defining Canada’s mission in Afghanistan: Pashtoons; opium; and regional cooperation. The ethno-cultural aspect of state-building in Afghanistan is not mentioned, he noted. The Pashtoons are the core nationality of Afghanistan and prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion, constituted the majority of the population. The invasion displaced Pashtoons to neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran. If we consider this dynamic, the success of reconstruction in Afghanistan takes on another dimension; at stake in rebuilding efforts is the self-determination of the Pashtoon people. If Pashtoons are to have relations with their self-identified homeland, then the bilateral border dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan must be resolved. Since the expiration of the 100-year-old Durand Treaty, which demarcated the boundary line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in 1993, there has been no legal border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If constructive dialogue is not fostered with Pakistan as part of wider reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, we risk further subjugating the Pashtoon people.
This point is related to the importance of regional cooperation to the mission in Afghanistan, namely with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Founded by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, also known as the “Shanghai Five,” in 2001, the SCO is an intergovernmental international organization aimed at confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions. Iran, India, and Pakistan continue to hold observer status in the SCO. The importance of the SCO to the mission in Afghanistan begins to come into focus; potentially all of Afghanistan’s neighbours could eventually be members of the SCO, an organization with which NATO is not formally communicating. Reconstruction efforts must include dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbours. Plekhanov advocates a multilateral mechanism for security and peacebuilding that brings NATO and Afghanistan’s neighbours to the same table; we all have a common interest in ensuring Afghanistan does not remain a failed state. If this multilateral mechanism is not seriously pursued, then Afghanistan will be reduced (if it has not already) to just one site of a contemporary “Great Game” in the region.
Last and probably most obviously is the issue of opium. The official position of the Government of Afghanistan is that opium production must be eradicated and alternative crop production encouraged through aid. In spite of this declaration in 2004, Helmand province in Afghanistan alone produced more than 20% of the world’s heroin last year. Clearly, the project of replacing poppy with alternative crops will take time to work. In the meantime, Plekhanov encouraged newer and more creative ways of approaching the poppy problem. What if the sale of opium could be limited to medicinal purposes and regulated by world pharmaceutical industries?
David Rudd reflected on Canada’s stakes in Afghanistan: the physical security of Canadians at home, our commitments to the United Nations, our allies and the downtrodden. Canada’s self-image is also at stake; after all, we played a lead role in developing the concept of a responsibility to protect, a concept now part of common international affairs parlance. Canada also has some more pragmatic concerns. Will we be seen as a puppet of Washington? Can we stay the course and not “cut and run?” If we do plan to stay the course, how do we define success? A successful mission would mean that Canada leaves behind a state that can function reasonably well on its own, commented Rudd. Some benchmarks to measure this kind of success would include: a capable government functioning in an environment of law and order; well-trained national and provincial security forces, especially police forces; a judiciary that can reasonably uphold the constitution; the eradication of poppy; a system of tax collection; and a Parliament imbued with a sense of national interest.
Having considered Canada’s options, what are our stakes in Afghanistan? We could get out now or stay with money and troops at the current level and continue with efforts to rebuild the security, economic and political infrastructure of Afghanistan. For Rudd, Afghanistan is not yet a failed mission. If we can reconcile the cultural facts of Afghan life and society with our own desire to politically and socially reengineer the country, then we might have a chance of succeeding. This means that as we work to shrink our security footprint and subsidize Afghani civil society, we will have to tolerate a mix of individuals, both good and bad, in Afghanistan’s government and perhaps even the prospect of opening relations between the Karzai government and the Taliban to restore order and security. There are no easy solutions and there is no easy way out but if we are to stay for the long-term, we must ask ourselves: “What risks and burdens are we willing to bear in support of a people with whom we do not have a natural affinity?”
The audience had ample time to ask questions of the panellists and many tough ones were posed. What is the likelihood of reaching the benchmarks of success outlined by Rudd in the near future? How can we isolate a discussion of Afghanistan from a discussion of Iraq? Given the impotence of the UN, to whom should we turn for clarity in our peacemaking missions? How representative are the governments of Afghanistan’s neighbours and what implications might this have for opening a constructive dialogue between the parties? Is it time to talk to the Taliban again? Is there actually a Taliban entity with whom to negotiate or is it comprised of disparate groups? Much still remains to be debated in the case of Afghanistan and the discussion will continue for many years to come.
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