The Canadian International Council, Toronto branch The Harvard Club of Toronto
The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, and
The United States Consulate General in Toronto present:

New Terrorism:
How to win this War

Brigadier General (Ret.) Russell D. Howard
(Harvard MPA ’88)

December 11, 2008

The CIC Toronto Branch collaborated with the Harvard Club of Toronto, the Institute of Public Administration of Canada and the U.S. Consulate General in Toronto to present a lunchtime ‘brown bag’ event with Retired U.S. Brigadier General Russell Howard. The event was generously hosted by WeirFoulds LLP on December 11, 2009. BGen (Ret’d) Howard has held numerous high-profile positions within the U.S. Army including Head and Deputy Head of the Department of Social Sciences and Founding Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point. After retiring from the Army he was Founding Director of the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and now teaches at the University of Montana. BGen (Ret’d) Howard has edited two books on anti- and counter terrorism. Forty attendees filled the WeirFoulds boardroom to take in BGen (Ret’d) Howard’s animated and entertaining presentation in which he addressed eight ways to successfully win the war on terror.

Howard’s first point was to reorient the language we use, namely to stop calling the current situation a ‘war’. Comparing America’s war footing at the end of World War Two with the current situation highlights his contention that by numbers, the U.S. is not now fighting a war; between 3.6% and 4.2% of GDP currently being spent on the military while the corresponding figure at the end of World War Two was 39.6%. Similarly, the current number of American men and women in uniform (including the National Guard) is around 2.5 million while at the end of World War Two, 12 million were on active duty. Secondly, Howard felt the National Security Act of 1947, which governs how the U.S. organizes, equips and trains for war, needs to be changed as it does not respond at all well to the threat of terror attacks on American soil. With over 86,000 policy and law enforcement jurisdictions across the U.S., institutional boundaries and impediments hamper counter-terrorist action.

Third, as terrorist attacks are undertaken by loose networks of people, counter-terrorist activity should also be organized and administered through networks. Such networks should be organized by lower ranking people across all Cabinet level departments who have experience in fighting networked terrorist organizations. However, the current conventional response has been to oppose terrorist networks with large, cumbersome, hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations.

Fourth, the current situation is primarily a fight against people whose activities are motivated by a violent ideology. Alternative idea structures therefore need to be supported in order to facilitate effective ideological opposition. However, American involvement in promoting alternative ideological movements would quickly undermine their legitimacy.

Howard’s fifth contention was that the ‘you can run but you can’t hide’ doctrine is not working, especially in relation to capturing or killing Bin Laden and his high level associates. Having invested so much money and bravado into these efforts without capturing him it appears to many that the U.S. has failed. Howard suggests rather than targeting terrorist group leaders it would make more sense to target mid level operatives. Doing so would keep the leaders disorganized while discouraging lower level operatives from aspiring to mid level status.

His sixth point was that offering educational alternatives are absolutely necessary, especially education that includes some kind of math, science and communication skills which are fundamental to actively participating in an ever more globalized world. Without such skills, young people have very few economic options open to them.

Howard’s seventh point stressed that we should not expect military action to be effective in diminishing the threat of terrorism as political solutions will ultimately be necessary.

Howard’s eighth and final observation addressing political and will to enact effective on the ground solutions took the form of an anecdote: When then-Colonel David Petreus took command of the U.S. mission in Mosul in Iraq all schools and universities in the city had been closed. As a result children and youths had nothing to occupy their time and a lack of alternatives to simple survival, which oftentimes took the form of armed opposition to American forces. Following consultation with local leaders, Petreus tasked many of his higher-ranking soldiers with ensuring schools at all levels reopened within two months. Levels of violence soon diminished as local children and youth returned to school.

The question period following BGen Howard’s address produced vibrant discussion around many topics such as the future of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan if American troop deployments there increase under an Obama administration and the role of Pakistan in contributing to insecurity in Afghanistan.

View the event flyer: Flyer